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Note
Dissent Without Disloyalty:
Expanding the Free Speech Rights of Military
Members Under the “General Articles” of the
UCMJ
Jason Steck*
In 1987, a 19-year-old airman in Japan hosted a “bulletin
board system” or “BBS,” where users could argue about sports,
operating systems, and politics. To compete with other BBS
systems, the young airman created a fictional character—
Illyovich, named after a twisting of Lenin’s middle name—to
1
provide provocative fodder by spewing a vulgar Marxist line.
After an anonymous complaint, the airman was arrested and
investigated for two months for the crime of making “disloyal
statements” in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of
2
Military Justice (UCMJ).
Nineteen years later, in an unrelated case, Army Lt. Ehren
3
Watada was charged under Article 133 of the UCMJ for,
4
among other things, “conduct unbecoming an officer.” The al* J.D. and Ph.D. candidate, University of Minnesota. Special thanks to
Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Professor Stephen Cribari, Professor Russell Anderson, and Brad Emmons for insightful suggestions. Thanks also to Professor
Ronald Krebs, Professor Phil Shively, Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Geoff Pipoly,
Stephanie Zuercher, Kelsey Kelley, Sandi Cruse, Lt. Col. Darin Williams, BJ
Franqui, Warner Emdee, and the board and staff of Minnesota Law Review.
The author would also like to extend special recognition to the Computer
Crime Division of the United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations
at Yokota Air Base, Japan, circa 1987. Without the aggressive eight-week investigation of a 19-year-old’s Commodore 128 computer by those OSI investigators, this Note might never have been written. Copyright © 2012 by Jason
Steck.
1. Personal experience of the author.
2. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934
(2006). The investigation was conducted by the local Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and was eventually terminated without significant disciplinary
action.
3. Id. art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933.
4. See Melanthia Mitchell, Fort Lewis Soldier Opposed to War Faces Mil-
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leged conduct included participation in a peace rally where he
5
expressed his belief that the war in Iraq was illegal. In both of
these cases, a military member was targeted for speech that
would be legally uncontroversial for a civilian.
Compared to civilians, military personnel enjoy sharply
6
curtailed First Amendment rights. Defenders of these restrictions highlight a tradition of judicial deference to military
7
culture. Advocates of greater rights for service members respond that such deference is over-applied at the cost of basic
8
civil liberties. Had it not been ended by an unusual procedural
9
error, and Lt. Watada’s subsequent resignation from the mili10
tary, Watada v. Head might have provided long-overdue aditary Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at B2, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20061110&slug=w
atada10m.
5. Id.; see also Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138 (W.D. Wash.
2007).
6. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 ( barring “contemptuous
words” towards senior officials); UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 ( proscribing
“conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman”); UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 ( prohibiting “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline”).
7. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of these protections.”); Captain
John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 368 (1998)
(“[J ]udicial deference to the military . . . is necessary . . . for the continued
maintenance of the military as an effective and efficient fighting force.”).
8. See, e.g., Emily Reuter, Note, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Proposal for Greater First Amendment Protections for America’s Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 336–37 (2007) (arguing for the application of “strict scrutiny” to military regulation of its members’ free speech
rights); Sarah N. Rosen, Comment, Be All That You Can Be? An Analysis of
and Proposed Alternative to Military Speech Regulations, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 875, 877 (2010) (arguing for application of public employee doctrine to the
military); Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel:
Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 858 (1987)
(advocating for loosened free speech restrictions for military members in
peacetime but deference to the military’s stringent regulations in wartime).
9. Watada, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (terminating Lt. Watada’s second
court-martial on double jeopardy grounds). The Obama Administration later
decided to drop charges against Lt. Watada. See Hal Bernton, Justice Department Drops Appeal in Watada Case, SEATTLE TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A1,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009184970_
webwatada.html.
10. See Army Officer Who Refused Iraq Duty Is Allowed to Resign, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/
27/us/27discharge.html.
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justments to the boundaries of dissent within the military. But
similar cases arise whenever national security issues are prom11
inent; the Watada case will surely not be the last.
This Note argues that existing restrictions on military free
speech rights are overbroad, obsolete, and should be replaced
by an adjusted application of existing doctrines of employer
regulation of employees’ speech. Part I summarizes existing
regulation of speech by military members under the general articles of the UCMJ—with particular focus on the treatment of
disloyal statements—and the foundations of judicial deference
to claims of military necessity. Part II critiques the assumptions that lie at the root of judicial deference to the military’s
regulation of its members’ speech, exposing the myth of an entirely separate military community as well as the pernicious effects of extra judicial punishments on expressions of dissent.
Part II also highlights the recent decline in judicial deference
that may provide an opening to reexamine free speech rights
for military members. Part III proposes that military speech
regulation be reformed to apply existing Pickering v. Board of
Education standards for government regulation of its employees’ speech, with adjustments for particular military opera12
tions. This Note concludes by arguing that implementation of
modified Pickering standards would provide better free speech
protections for military members than discretionary implementation by military commanders while avoiding interference
with military objectives that could accompany implementation
of unmodified Pickering standards.
I. DIFFERING FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND MILITARY MEMBERS
The government has a narrower ability to regulate civilian
employees’ speech compared to its virtually unlimited ability to
punish military members’ speech. When the government acts
as a civilian employer, the courts have required it to respect
employees’ rights to speak on matters of public concern unless
doing so significantly harms the operation of the workplace.
But when the government acts as military employer, the courts
have broadly deferred to almost all government restrictions on
speech.

11. Reuter, supra note 8, at 316 (noting the correlation between the occurrence of foreign wars and public interest in military dissent).
12. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

2012]

FREE SPEECH OF MILITARY MEMBERS

1609

A. CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ENJOY SIGNIFICANT
FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Courts have been somewhat protective of the free speech
rights of civilian government employees. In 1968, the Supreme
Court in Pickering considered the case of a school teacher who
was fired after writing a letter to a newspaper that was critical
13
of her superiors’ handling of school funding proposals. The
Court rejected the notion that civilian employees owe an un14
qualified duty to refrain from public criticism. Instead, the
Court established a balancing test for government regulation of
its civilian employees’ speech, weighing the government’s interest as an employer against employees’ free speech rights as cit15
izens. First, the Court noted that speech related to a “public
16
concern” must receive First Amendment protections. In fact,
when civilian employees speak out on a matter of public policy,
the Court noted that they are often among the best-informed
17
contributors to public debate on the subject. As such, the
Court was reluctant to allow their speech to be suppressed by
18
fears of termination.
However, this protection is not absolute. Rather, it applies
only to speech regarding matters of public concern. In Connick
v. Myers, the Court considered the case of an Assistant District
Attorney dismissed for insubordination after distributing a
19
questionnaire containing material critical of her superiors.
The Court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect
employee speech relating to purely personal interests, such as
20
personal criticism of superiors. When employee speech does
not relate to a public concern, the Court instructs deference to
the government’s interest in maintaining the authority struc13. Id. at 564.
14. Id. at 568–69.
15. Id. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”).
16. Id. at 574 (“[S]tatements by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the
statements are directed at their nominal superiors.” (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 (1964))).
17. Id. at 571–72.
18. Id. at 572.
19. 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
20. Id. at 147; see also id. at 149 (“[ T ]he First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over
internal office affairs.”).
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ture and efficient functioning of the office. Moreover, the
Court has left open the question of whether statements that
were “knowingly or recklessly false” might be the basis for termination even if they were regarding a matter of public
22
concern.
In Connick, the Court also limited the reach of the government’s regulation of its civilian employees’ speech in terms
of when and where the speech occurs. The Court noted that,
when acting as an employer, the government can punish speech
that occurs in the workplace, occurs during work time, or oth23
erwise interferes directly with the functioning of the office.
Specifically, the Court found that the purpose of the disgruntled employee’s survey questions was “not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition” in sup24
port of her protest against an adverse personnel action. Thus,
the effect of granting First Amendment protection in such a
context would be to create a novel “grant of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to
25
those who do not work for the State.” The Court thus apparently sought to balance the government’s interest in an efficiently functioning workplace against the employees’ right to
26
engage in public advocacy on matters of public concern. But
the Court has limited the allowable scope of this regulation by
prohibiting the government from punishing speech that relates
to nonoffice matters, does not impact the workplace, or takes
27
place outside the workplace. Thus, while the Connick Court
21. Id. at 153; see also id. at 154 (“[ I ]t would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory
for the great principles of free expression if the [First] Amendment’s safeguarding of a public employee’s right . . . to participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented here.”).
22. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (“[ W ]e have no occasion to pass upon
the additional question whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly
false would . . . still be protected by the First Amendment.”).
23. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153; see also id. at 153 n.13 (noting that speech
“on the employee’s own time[ ] and in non-work areas of the office” might receive greater protection).
24. Id. at 148.
25. Id. at 147.
26. Id. at 150 (applying the Pickering balancing test).
27. Compare id. at 153 (noting that the distribution of a questionnaire
took place in the workplace and caused the employee to “leave her work”), with
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 454 (1995) (striking down government regulations banning compensation for non-workplace
speaking appearances by government civilian employees), and Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1987) (holding that workplace comment ap-
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may have disavowed any desire to extend government employees’ speech rights beyond those of private sector workers, the
restrictions placed on the scope of the government’s regulation
of employee speech nonetheless give government employees
28
some unique protections.
29
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court further narrowed the
protection of employee speech in the workplace. Garcetti involved a case where a district attorney disagreed with his supervisor’s decision to proceed with a prosecution notwithstanding what the district attorney believed to be significant
30
government misconduct. After expressing his disagreement,
the district attorney alleged “a series of retaliatory employment
actions” and brought suit alleging infringement of, inter alia,
31
his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court ruled
against the district attorney, holding that speech that takes
place in the course of performing assigned duties is not protect32
ed by the First Amendment. Thus, civilian speech in a government workplace is protected, but only if it involves a matter
of public concern, does not disrupt the functioning of the office,
and is not made merely in the course of official duties.
B. MILITARY MEMBERS FACE SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINTS ON
SPEECH
By contrast, free speech rights in the military are much
more constrained. This Section highlights the constraints on
free speech applied to military members. The UCMJ, which
binds all military members, prohibits not only “conduct unbe33
coming an officer,” but also “all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline” and “all conduct of a na34
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” These proviplauding an attempt on the life of the President did not interfere with the
functioning of the office and could therefore not be cause for termination), and
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73 (observing that writing a letter critical of government policy did not interfere with a teacher’s ability to perform his duties).
28. See generally BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1–10 (2007) (arguing that freedom of
speech in the workplace, particularly in the private sector, is excessively and
needlessly limited).
29. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
30. Id. at 414 –15.
31. Id. at 415.
32. Id. at 421.
33. UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006).
34. Id. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934.
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sions exist in Articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ, and are com35
monly referred to as the “general articles.” Similar to the relationship between federal statutes and administrative rules, the
general articles are implemented by detailed specifications of
36
particular crimes in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).
Among the wide range of speech and conduct prohibited by the
37
38
general articles is the making of “disloyal statements.”
Military members have, however, challenged the general
articles as overbroad restraints on their free speech rights in
violation of the First Amendment. For example, in the 1974
case Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court took up an appeal from
an Army officer who, while serving as a trainer for medics destined for service in the Vietnam War, encouraged black soldiers
39
to refuse orders to serve. Upon conviction by court-martial for,
inter alia, violations of the general articles, the officer challenged the constitutionality of the general articles as over40
broad, in violation of the First Amendment. The Court rejected this challenge, holding that the general articles are not
overbroad because the MCM narrows the wide textual reach of
41
the general articles themselves. The Court also noted that
these MCM limits implemented earlier court decisions requiring that, in order to be punishable, speech must “directly and
42
palpably” threaten military discipline by “call[ing] for active
43
opposition to the military policy of the United States.” Military courts have reviewed and reaffirmed the continuing rele44
vance of this holding as recently as 2008. Notwithstanding
such gestures, however, the courts have generally applied a
35. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 passim (1974).
36. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, U.S. MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL pt. IV, para. 59–113 (2008) [hereinafter MCM].
37. The general articles are also implicated in other recent controversies,
including the recent struggles to repeal the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy barring service by homosexuals unless they concealed their sexual orientation. It is noteworthy, for example, that one of the most important works
criticizing the policy drew its title from the language of Article 133. See RANDY
SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY
(1994).
38. MCM, supra note 36, pt. IV, para. 72.
39. Parker, 417 U.S. at 736–37 (1974); see also id. at 738–39 nn. 5–6.
40. Id. at 752.
41. Id. (citing what is now MCM, supra note 36, pt. IV, para. 72).
42. Id. at 753 (quoting United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343, 345
(C.M.A. 1964)).
43. Id. (citing United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338 (C.M.A. 1972)).
44. United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
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much more deferential standard of review towards military
cases involving free speech claims compared to similar civilian
claims.
C. THE COURT HAS CITED A SEPARATE MILITARY CULTURE AS
JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
Having noted the pattern of judicial deference towards military regulations impinging on members’ free speech rights,
this Section highlights the foundations of this deference. Specifically, this Section outlines the courts’ adherence to a set of beliefs about the military as separate, apart, and even incompatible with the civilian world.
In cases upholding the general articles and applying them
to free speech issues, the military courts have sometimes used
the rhetoric of a balancing test, but without actually applying
the balancing method outlined in the Court’s civilian prece45
dents in Pickering and Connick. Rather, when assessing the
reach of military members’ free speech rights against military
claims of necessity, courts “balance” using a scale heavily
weighted in favor of the government, interpreting the MCM
limitations on the general articles very loosely. For example,
while the Court in Parker specifically rejected the common notion that military members entirely forfeit their free speech
rights upon joining the military, it endorsed a fundamentally
different basis for interpreting and applying those rights: the
46
“different character of the military community.” Moreover, the
Court drew the boundary of permissible government interests
much more broadly in the military context, allowing the military to punish not only speech that interferes with office func-

45. See, e.g., Priest, 45 C.M.R. at 344 (“[ T ]he proper balance must be
struck between the essential needs of the armed services and the right to
speak out as a free American.”).
46. Parker, 417 U.S. at 758; see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354
(1980) (“[ T ]he military services ‘must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.’” (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975))); Parker, 417 U.S. at 743 (“[ T ]he military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.”); Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”); Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448 n.3 (“[A]dditional burdens may be placed on First Amendment rights in the context of the military, given the different character of the
military community and mission.”); cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838
(1976) (“[ T ]he business of a military installation like Fort Dix [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”).
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tioning, but also any speech that might generally “undermine
47
the effectiveness of response to command.”
This approach coheres with a pattern of civilian deference
to military courts in the interpretation and administration of
48
military justice. The Court has analogized military law to
state law, highlighting the absence of any role for federal civil49
ian courts in interpreting it. The Court has also emphasized
50
the unique powers of Congress regarding military matters.
Because Congress has exercised these powers to establish a
“carefully designed military justice system,” the Court has been
strongly inclined to forego meaningful civilian review whenever
51
possible. Perhaps most importantly, the Court has proclaimed
that the judiciary has a general lack of competence regarding
52
military affairs. Indeed, the Court has tacitly embraced the
views of Professor Samuel P. Huntington, who prescribed rigid
cultural separation and mutual assumptions of professional in-

47. Parker, 417 U.S. at 759 (citing United States v. Gray, 42 C.M.R. 255
(1970)). But see Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448 (requiring that the prosecution also
show a “direct and palpable connection between [a member’s] speech and the
military mission or military environment,” but failing to provide any definition
as to what would or would not constitute such a connection).
48. See generally Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV.
1009 (1990) (arguing for a reconsideration of the proper balance between civil
liberties and military institutions).
49. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
50. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (citing Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) as well as Congress’s own invocation of U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8).
51. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 753 (1975) (“[Cases] must be
assessed in light of the deference that should be accorded the judgments of the
carefully designed military justice system established by Congress.”); see also
Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 –49 (tracing the history of deference by civilian courts
to the military justice system); Burns, 346 U.S. at 139–42 (staking out a carefully limited role for civilian courts when reviewing the actions of military
courts); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
181, 186–87 (1962) (tracing the tradition of deference to military courts as far
back as 1863 in an article authored by the then-sitting Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court).
52. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[ I ]t is difficult to conceive
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.
The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training,
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
Branches.”); see also Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66 (noting a “healthy deference to
legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs”); Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953) (“[J ]udges are not given the task of running the Army.”).
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53

capacity between civilian and military worlds. Huntington’s
separatist civil-military prescription has, in fact, advanced to
54
the level of consensus throughout American political culture.
Provoked in part by the Vietnam War experience, however,
some began to question whether the assumption of cultural
separation and the resulting judicial deference remained ap55
propriate, if indeed it ever was. For example, some legal
scholars questioned the underlying presumption of a unique
and separate military culture requiring judicial deference and
56
abstention. Others specifically highlighted free speech controversies from the Vietnam era, arguing that the inadequacies of
the military justice system in dealing with such issues de57
manded greater intervention by civilian courts.
Scholars have broadened and deepened these critiques
since the end of the Cold War. Some have posited the emergence of a “postmodern military” that in its essential elements
58
is akin to any civilian profession. Scholars specializing in civil-

53. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 83–85 (1957)
(arguing that, at the height of the Cold War, robust cultural and professional
separation between military and civilian spheres was vital to maintaining military effectiveness).
54. ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND 226 (2002) (“[Huntington’s
view] has come . . . to be commonly viewed as the ‘normal’ theory of civilmilitary relations—the accepted theoretical standard against which the current reality is to be judged.”).
55. See, e.g., Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Constitutional
Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 396, 400 (1976) (detailing the growing together of civilian and military society).
56. See, e.g., James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military
Uniqueness and Servicemen’s Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 205
(1984) (“[ T ]he typical or common member of the armed forces is not an alien
outcast but is one of us.”).
57. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution
in the First Amendment: Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the
Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42, 42 (1975) (reviewing Vietnam-era
developments in the application of military restrictions on military members’
First Amendment rights); Edward F. Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen’s First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 373 (1971) (“It is
now vitally important that consideration be given to civilian law precedents . . . in these military speech cases.”); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 43, 156 (1974) (same); Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the
Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 187 (1957) (reviewing earlier policy debates
regarding free speech in the military).
58. Charles C. Moskos et al., Armed Forces After the Cold War, in THE
POSTMODERN MILITARY 1, 2 (Charles C. Moskos et al. eds., 2000).
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military relations have noted the increasing integration of the
59
military into civilian political debates as well.
Civilian courts have also begun to cast a more engaged and
critical eye on military policies. In recent years, for example,
the Court refused to defer to claims of military exigencies in the
60
treatment of prisoners. Lower courts have also begun to more
aggressively review the claims of military members challenging
61
infringements on civil liberties arising from military policies.
In fact, civilian courts generally appear to be increasingly willing to review military policies and the holdings of military
62
courts.
Still, constraints on the free speech rights of military
members remain considerable, and legal scholars have proposed a range of responses. At one extreme, some argue that
courts should continue to defer to military judgments, leaving
any accommodations to the discretion of military command63
ers. On the other extreme, some argue for unconditional ap64
plication of Pickering balancing to military members. Between
these polar approaches, some have criticized specific military

59. See generally MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN
TARY: THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1999)

CONTROL OF THE MILI(emphasizing the notion
that civilian authorities inevitably pay close attention to military matters, especially in wartime); PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2003) (arguing that the civilian executive monitors the actions of military agents).
60. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (requiring the
government to provide evidence of actual impact on the mission before the
Court would defer to the withholding of civilian habeus corpus review for prisoners); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–33 (2004) (applying a balancing
test between a detainee’s interests and the government’s interests rather than
deferring to the military outright); see also id. at 535 (“While we accord the
greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in
matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war . . . it does not infringe on
the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own timehonored and constitutionally mandated roles.” (emphasis added)).
61. See, e.g., Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308,
1310 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (striking down the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy on equal-protection grounds notwithstanding continuing military claims
to require prohibitions against open homosexuality in the military as necessary to “high morale, good order, discipline, and unit cohesion”).
62. Id.; see also Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1147 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (asserting a willingness to intervene in ongoing court-martial proceedings once the petitioner’s options within the military justice system are
exhausted).
63. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 7, at 307–11.
64. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8, at 898–903.
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65

regulations and proposed reforms that would improve free
66
speech protections only during peacetime. Thus far, however,
none have articulated specific proposals to adapt Pickering balancing to the unique requirements of the military context.
II. ANALYZING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF REDUCED
MILITARY FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
This Part critiques the bases for civilian judicial deference
towards restrictions on military members’ free speech rights.
Specifically, this Part argues that the assumption of a “separate culture” in the military was probably never true, and is
certainly untrue in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War eras.
Moreover, because courts have misunderstood the role of dissent in the military, they have simultaneously overestimated
its impact on military effectiveness and underestimated the
impact of restrictions on military members’ speech. However,
courts’ traditional deference with regard to military affairs has
been fading in recent years. This new judicial engagement
opens a window of opportunity for reform in military members’
free speech rights, allowing courts to use the growing convergence between the concerns that motivate regulation of both
military and civilian employees’ speech.
A. THE MYTH OF CULTURAL SEPARATION BETWEEN CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY WORLDS
This Section critiques the main judicial justification for deferring to claims of military necessity in the restrictions on
members’ free speech rights. Specifically, this Section argues
that the image of a wall of separation dividing civilian and military cultures has always been more idealized myth than reality. From its beginning, the United States military and its civilian society have been unusually “permeable” compared to
67
European countries. In particular, the extensive use of militia
to supplement military forces in the nation’s early history

65. Katherine C. Den Bleyker, Note, The First Amendment Versus Operational Security: Where Should the Milblogging Balance Lie?, 17 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401, 404 –05 (2007) (critiquing restrictions
on military bloggers and calling for strict scrutiny, but only in that specific
context).
66. Sugin, supra note 8, at 876–90.
67. Ira Katznelson, Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early American
Statebuilding, in SHAPED BY WAR AND TRADE 82, 101 (Ira Katznelson & Martin Shefter eds., 2002).
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blurred the line between the civilian and military use of force.
And American political debates frequently feature debates over
universal military training, seeking to conjoin military virtues
69
with citizenship. These debates are often intertwined with de70
bates over conscription. Indeed, many advocates of the draft
saw conscription as an important tool for maintaining the his71
tory of civil-military integration in the United States.
As discussed above, the courts have generally embraced
Professor Huntington’s view of a military society set apart in
72
the name of military effectiveness and professionalism. Specifically, the Supreme Court has noted that “within the military
community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy
73
as there is in the larger civilian community.” The Court has
seen these restrictions as necessary to accomplish the military’s
74
mission. These restrictions and their reasons are, according to
75
the Court, “without counterpart in civilian life.” Moreover, the
Court has disavowed even the role of the courts to weigh the
necessity of military restrictions, deferring to “the professional
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative im76
portance of a particular military interest.” Thus, the Court
has sanctioned even restrictions that involve fundamental First
Amendment claims when the military’s only interest is “uni77
form dress requirements.” The Court upheld these restrictions
68. Id. But see ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS 127 (1985) (noting the skepticism of professional military officers towards militia forces
throughout American history).
69. See COHEN, supra note 68, at 129–33 (reviewing those debates).
70. See, e.g., GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940–1973, at 88–109 (1993)
(recounting President Truman’s efforts to end the draft and enact universal
military training at the same time).
71. See, e.g., Morris Janowitz, The All-Volunteer Military as a “Sociopolitical” Problem, 22 SOC. PROBS. 432, 448 (1975); see also BERNARD ROSTKER, I
WANT YOU! THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 374 –75 (2006)
(recounting the testimony of Professor Charles Moskos to Congress seeking to
either return to conscription or enact universal military training).
72. See supra notes 45–54and accompanying text.
73. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974).
74. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986) (quoting Parker,
417 U.S. at 743).
75. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
76. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
77. Id. at 509 (“The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment.”); see also id.
at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . evades its responsibility by
eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that
interfere with the fundamental constitutional rights of military personnel.”).
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even though there was “almost no danger of impairment of
78
the . . . military mission” and in spite of suspicion that “the
79
Government has exaggerated the importance of [its] interest.”
In short, because of its belief in the absolute incompetence of
civilian institutions to evaluate the decisions of military professionals, the Court has adopted, as Justice Brennan put it in
dissent, “a subrational-basis standard—absolute, uncritical
‘deference to the professional judgment of military authori80
ties’ . . . no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.”
As noted earlier, this view of absolute civil-military separa81
tion has always been highly questionable. Since the end of the
Vietnam War, the all-volunteer force has transformed the U.S.
military in ways that depart even more dramatically from the
separate worlds presumed by the courts. Today’s military con82
tains no draftees and no realistic prospect exists of ever re83
turning to conscription. Military jobs often require extensive
technical expertise and specialized training unsuitable for con84
scripts. Demographically, the average military member of an
all-volunteer military remains in the military for a much longer
85
period than soldiers in the draft-era military. Even many
overseas deployments now include family members, resulting
in overseas military bases that sometimes resemble large
86
American civilian communities. Additionally, the uniformed
ranks themselves are supplemented both in the United States
and overseas by large numbers of civilian government workers

78. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 512.
80. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 507 (majority
opinion)).
81. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
82. The Pentagon announced the end of the draft on January 27, 1973.
ROSTKER, supra note 71, at 265.
83. See id. at 756 (noting a nearly unanimous vote in the House of Representatives to reject a return to conscription even at the height of manpower
pressures caused by the Iraq War); Janowitz, supra note 71, at 436 (explaining
how a widespread “persistent reluctance to serve in the military” in advanced
industrial societies leads inevitably towards all-volunteer militaries).
84. Janowitz, supra note 71, at 437 (“The all-volunteer system has also
been designed to articulate with contemporary military technology which requires longer periods of training.”); see also id. at 438–39.
85. Id. at 437–38.
86. Cf. GENERAL H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF & PETER PETRE, IT DOESN’T
TAKE A HERO 261–63 (1992) (recounting the author’s difficulties upon finding
that his military command responsibilities in Germany included responsibility
for a large number of American civilians).
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and contractors. In short, the military is not in fact segregated
into a separate and distinct cultural environment. It is exposed
to civilians and shares many features with a civilian career.
Research into the evolution of the all-volunteer military
has often emphasized the degree to which the military life has
become transformed into just another career choice. Indeed,
Professor Charles Moskos speaks of a “postmodern military”
where men and women in uniform perform daily duties that
88
are often exactly the same as civilian counterparts. When they
return home from work and take off their uniforms, most military members are indistinguishable from their civilian neigh89
bors. In fact, the all-volunteer military puts great emphasis on
comparisons between functional specialties in the military and
90
corresponding civilian occupations. And military leaders often
value the all-volunteer force in part for the availability of civilian tools of workplace rule enforcement; for example, soldiers in
a conscripted military often eagerly sought to get kicked out of
91
the service, while in an all-volunteer military termination is a
92
punishment and a deterrent.
87. See Charles C. Moskos, Toward a Postmodern Military: The United
States as Paradigm, in THE POSTMODERN MILITARY, supra note 58, at 14, 21
(noting the deployment of 10,000 civilian workers to Saudi Arabia during the
Gulf War). See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS 19 (2003) (noting the increasing use of contractors to fulfill military functions, even including combat).
88. Moskos et al., supra note 58 (“The Postmodern military is characterized by . . . increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both
structurally and culturally.”); see also Hirschhorn, supra note 56, at 205–06
(noting that most military jobs have exact civilian counterparts and that even
combat soldiers may not experience a unique relationship with government
authority).
89. Cf. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55 (“The ‘society apart’ was a
valid description of the small, 19th century, regular Army fighting Indians on
the frontier. . . . But by 1974, the military had become a multimillion-person
employer involved in almost every aspect of American life. . . . [ T ]he modern
military shows increasing signs of ‘creeping civilianism.’”).
90. Cf. BETH J. ASCH & JAMES R. HOSEK, MILITARY COMPENSATION:
TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS 4 –12 (1999) (evaluating the “pay gap” between
military functional specialties and their civilian counterparts).
91. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55, at 402 (“The very necessity of conscription in America’s last four wars argues that [the civilian sanction
of firing unsatisfactory performers] would be inadequate.”); see also M*A*S*H
(CBS television broadcast 1972–83) (character of Corporal Klinger).
92. See Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Manpower and Pers. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 95th
Cong. 60–61, 68 (1978) (testimony of General Smith, Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel). Compare OTTO F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC IMAGES OF MENTAL ILLNESS 6 (1995) (recounting the struggles of fictional draftee
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A few scholars have suggested that the existence of an ideological gap between civilian and military communities necessitates separation. According to this theme, military culture reflects a uniquely conservative worldview that must be isolated
from contemporary political debate unless civilian society is al93
so politically conservative. Some have even suggested, rather
fanatically, that political dissent arising within the American
94
military risks a coup. But although research shows that military members tend to be somewhat more politically conservative and religious than civilians, these are statistical deviations
95
of degree rather than cultural type. Ample groups of civilians
exist that are just as politically conservative and religious as
96
the military, if not more so. Moreover, studies have found that
college professors deviate politically from the rest of society far
97
more than the military does, yet no one suggests that academia be deemed a separate culture subject to reduced constitu-

Corporal Klinger seeking to obtain a discharge by feigning transvestite and
bizarre behaviors), with NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE 1–25 (2009)
(recounting the struggles of gay service members to remain in the military
under the 1993 “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy).
93. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 53, at 79 (casting the “military ethic” as
inherently conservative); id. at 90–91, 153–55 (arguing that civilian “liberalism” is hostile and contemptuous towards the military); id. at 83–85, 96–97
(arguing that the way to accommodate the conservative military mind with
liberal civilian politics is separation); id. at 463–64 (arguing that if high international threat makes separation impossible, then civilian society must become more conservative to avoid undermining military effectiveness).
94. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 55, at 405–06 (“Any expression of
disagreement by servicemen might move the military into politics, or prompt a
military coup.”); see also Charles C. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American
Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 1992–93, at 2, available at http://
media.portland.indymedia.org/media/2004/05/288433.pdf (hypothetically describing how a military drawn into politics could result in a coup).
95. See Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, Conclusion: The Gap and
What It Means for American National Security, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS
459, 459–61 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001).
96. Cf. Robert S. Erikson et al., State Political Culture and Public Opinion, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 803 (1987) (finding that living in North Dakota
was a greater predictor of political ideology than, among other things, religion).
97. Compare Stanley Rothman et al., Politics and Professional Advancement Among College Faculty, 3 THE FORUM, no. 1, art. 2, 2005, at 5 (“[C]ollege
faculty are about four times as liberal as the general public.”), with Ole R.
Holsti, Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and
Military Elites at the Start of the New Millennium, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS, supra note 95, at 15, 27–29 (finding Republican party identification
within the military approximately twice that in the nonveteran civilian
population).

1622

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1606

98

tional rights. Given the reality of the “postmodern military,”
whatever validity the Huntingtonian thesis of separate cultures
had for justifying a general legal separation between military
99
and civilian free speech rights now seems questionable. The
combination of theoretical and empirical flaws in the hypothesis of civil-military separatism produces a weak foundation for
judicial deference to military restrictions on members’ free
speech.
B. COURTS MISUNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF DISSENT IN THE
MILITARY
In addition to the idea of cultural separation, courts have
justified deference to military restrictions on speech by pointing
to the threat of disorder in the ranks if speech were unconstrained. This Section examines those fears, concluding that
they are overblown.
Courts frequently rely upon two common assumptions
about the threat of dissent in the military ranks. First, courts
frequently assume that even mere exposure to dissent may
cause disorder in the form of actual disobedience among the
100
troops. Second, courts often assume that the restrictions that
are imposed do not amount to a forfeiture of military members’
101
First Amendment rights. But neither of these assumptions regarding the role of dissent in the military holds true in practice.
1. Cases of Dissent by Military Members Have Not Resulted
in Disorder
Case law upholding restrictions on “disloyal statements” is
remarkable for the prevalence of speculative harms that are believed to flow from that dissent. Military and other courts have
98. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (acknowledging
heightened First Amendment protections for education professionals).
99. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (condemning the use of “a series of platitudes about the special nature
and overwhelming importance of military necessity”). But see Hirschhorn, supra note 56, at 207–08 (arguing that Justice Brennan and others oversell their
critique of the separate community theory).
100. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (“Speech that is protected in the civilian population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness
of response to command.” (quoting United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344
(C.M.A. 1972))).
101. See, e.g., id. at 758 (“While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections.”).

2012]

FREE SPEECH OF MILITARY MEMBERS

1623

cast about in vain for cases featuring actual effects on morale
or unit operation. For example, even in the seminal Parker
case, where an Army officer openly encouraged enlisted men to
102
disobey orders to deploy to Vietnam, the Supreme Court cited
no evidence that anyone had actually heeded the officer’s call.
In fact, the Parker dissent characterized the effect as harmless
103
Finding no actual mission impact, military
commentary.
courts have tacitly retreated from the requirement that the
104
threat to discipline be “direct and palpable,” emphasizing instead that disloyal statements need not be effective to be legal105
ly prohibited. Indeed, courts have ruled that the damage to
morale may be merely intended, unless the likelihood of success
would be so remote “as to foreclose all possibility of successful
106
promotion of disloyalty.” Some courts have even been willing
to uphold punishment for speech that was not intended to promote disloyalty but might speculatively produce such an ef107
fect. But this dearth of actual evidence that dissent causes
military disorder raises the inference that many of the prohibitions against dissent by military members may be the result of
108
unfounded fears. In any case, the net effect is to strip the limitations that the Parker Court cited on the scope of the general
109
articles of much of their bite.

102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
103. Parker, 417 U.S. at 771–72 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 752–53 (majority opinion) (citing the “direct[ ] and palpabl[e]”
requirement as a key limitation on the scope of the general articles).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 42 C.M.R. 255, 259 (C.M.A. 1970)
(“Successful propagation of disloyalty is not an essential element of the offense.”).
106. Id. at 68 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R.
338, 343 (C.M.A. 1972) (finding that distribution of pamphlets calling for sabotage against the Vietnam War is sufficient to show prejudice to discipline even
in the absence of any evidence of any military members heeding the call).
107. See Sec. of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 680 (1974) ( per curium)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that undistributed pamphlets for which the
Court had affirmed a conviction merely asked questions that “might at best
have resulted in letters to [ ] family or Congressman or Senators” rather than
any effect on other members’ accomplishment of their duties).
108. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
failure of a military court in a previous case to weigh the plausibility of its
speculation that a reservist second lieutenant could become a threat to civilian
control of the military by making statements critical of the Vietnam War).
109. See id. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (dismissing the “direct and palpable” limitation as without any “substantive content” sufficient to limit Articles 133 and 134).
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2. The Impact of Suppression of Speech Exceeds the Reach of
Formal Restrictions
While courts have exaggerated the impact of dissent on
military effectiveness, they have underestimated the impact of
legal restrictions on free speech in the all-volunteer military.
Because the available punishments for any offense include the
110
possibility of discharge or career-ending stigma, many military members are likely to steer clear of anything that even
might result in investigation. Members may fear the investigation itself as much as its outcome because of nonjudicial pun111
ishments that exist within the military. Specifically, military
members faced with a court-martial are often offered a choice
between nonjudicial punishment by their commander or a
112
court-martial, either of which could end their career. Moreover, a military member who is merely under investigation may
lose his security clearance temporarily and be assigned to closely supervised menial duties wherein merely showing up late to
113
work can be deemed “failure to go” in violation of the UCMJ.
Thus, because military members cannot be certain exactly
where the line between allowable dissent and “disloyal state114
ments” may lie and because even coming within earshot of
that line could endanger their career, the scope of speech that
is suppressed in practice is probably far broader than even the
broad scope of the restrictions actually applied. In a civilian
context, the courts might be expected to closely scrutinize such
a system as potentially having a “chilling effect” on otherwise
115
protected First Amendment expression. But courts’ tradition
110. See LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE 165–170 (2010) (outlining various nonjudicial means for separating military members from the service even without a court martial).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 148–73 (outlining the nonjudicial punishment process and
its potential consequences).
113. See id. at 65–66 (explaining how failure to show up for work on time is
a crime under military law).
114. Compare United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(holding that statements directed towards an entirely civilian audience lacked
“direct and palpable effect” on discipline), with Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp.
2d 1136, 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (analyzing case of Army Lieutenant charged
with violating Article 133 for having made “public statements” critical of the
Iraq War), and Mitchell, supra note 4 (making clear that the “public statements” referenced in Watada were media interviews).
115. Cf., e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,
556–57 (1963) (noting the Court’s concern with statutes that are vague or
broad enough to deter speakers from engaging in protected expression out of
fear that they might cross an uncertain line).
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of deference has thus far prevented application of this doctrine
116
to the military context.
C. CIVILIAN COURT DEFERENCE REGARDING MILITARY
MATTERS IS DECLINING
While the courts have traditionally been very deferential
with regard to military matters, cracks are beginning to
emerge. In recent cases dealing with detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, for example, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
government’s contention that the courts had no competence in
117
national security matters. In doing so, the Court approvingly
cited a dissent from perhaps the most sweeping case of the
Court’s deference to a claim of military exigency—Korematsu v.
United States, where the Court notoriously deferred to military
claims of necessity and upheld the exclusion of Japanese Amer118
icans from the West Coast during World War II.
Lower courts in recent years have also begun to press the
boundaries of the Court’s military deference. For example, in
Watada v. Head, a federal district court stepped in to block a
court-martial retrial in the case of a service member claiming
119
double jeopardy. While the district court claimed adherence
to the Supreme Court’s deferential mandates regarding military courts, it appeared to interpret the parameters of that def120
erence much more narrowly than the Supreme Court had.
116. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 754 (1974) (refusing to apply
void-for-vagueness doctrine to a free speech infringement claim in the military
context).
117. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527, 534 –35 (2004) (noting
the traditional deference to the executive branch in time of war, but then applying an interest balancing test); see also id. at 535 (“What are the allowable
limits of military discretion . . . are judicial questions.” (quoting Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932))).
118. See id. at 535 (“[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the
judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with
other interests reconciled.” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233–34
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting))).
119. Watada, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
120. Compare id. at 1148–49 (finding civilian courts competent to intervene
at the point that military courts have concluded their consideration of the discrete issue of defendant’s double jeopardy claims but prior to the conclusion of
all of the defendant’s military court proceedings), with Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) (refusing to allow civilian courts to issue injunctions until the “resolution of his case” in the military courts (emphasis
added)). The difference is subtle, but important in that it may indicate a
change from deference to the military courts pending the conclusion of a case
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And in Witt v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, the district
court considered a challenge to the military’s “don’t ask, don’t
121
tell” policy. Other courts had upheld the policy, citing the
122
tradition of judicial deference in military affairs. But the Witt
court rejected Congress’s findings of a “fundamentally different” military context, striking down the policy as unconstitutional using the same standards used for civilian claims of dis123
crimination based on sexual orientation.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which
provides the primary civilian review of military courts124
martial, has also begun to cast a more skeptical eye towards
the general articles of the UCMJ. Specifically, in United States
v. Fosler, the court held that prosecutors charging offenses under Article 134 must specify which clause of the Article was be125
ing charged. While this represents only a relatively minor
procedural change in practice, the reasoning in Fosler is important. The court held that more specific charging was required specifically in order to give military members greater
clarity about what conduct was being charged under the broad126
ly sweeping general articles. It is reasonable to believe that
the court could be sympathetic to a similar argument that military members need greater clarity about what kinds of speech
are proscribed under Article 134 as well.
While, even collectively, these decisions continue to fall
well short of challenging the linchpins of civilian courts’ defer127
ence in military matters, they nonetheless represent indications that the courts may be becoming less deferential towards
to a willingness to intervene repeatedly as particular issues become ripe for
review within a case.
121. 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1309–10 (W.D. Wash. 2010). The Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell (DADT) policy has since been repealed by President Barack H.
Obama, thus mooting legal challenges. CNN Wire Staff, Obama Signs Repeal
of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, CNN.COM (Dec. 22, 2010), http://articles.cnn
.com/2010-12-22/politics/dadt.repeal_1_repeal-openly-gay-men-president-barack
-obama. But it is sufficient to note the decline in judicial deference to claims of
military necessity for special restrictions on service members’ rights.
122. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 57–60 (1st Cir. 2008).
123. Witt, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 1311, 1315–17.
124. See Appellate Review of Courts-Martial, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ARMED FORCES (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/
appell_review.htm (outlining the jurisdiction of the CAAF).
125. United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 232–33 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
126. Id. at 229–31.
127. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) ( barring
military members from resorting to the courts to redress personal injuries suffered in the course of military service).
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the military over time, particularly when basic civil liberties
claims are implicated and particularly with regard to the kinds
of matters addressed by the general articles.
D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CONCERNS ABOUT EMPLOYEE
SPEECH ARE SIMILAR
The factors discussed above—the decreasing separation of
military and civilian culture combined with the lack of harm
from dissent within the military ranks and the increasing willingness of the courts to cast a skeptical eye on military policies—provide only an opportunity for reform in military members’ free speech rights. By themselves, these factors do not
indicate what form such reforms should take. This Section assesses the similarity between concerns about workplace speech
in the civilian and military context. This similarity justifies using standards adapted from the civilian workplace in the military workplace.
It is noteworthy that concerns over potential disruption
from workplace speech are similar in civilian and military
128
workplaces. For example, in Connick, the Supreme Court upheld disciplinary action in part because any employee’s questionnaire that was critical of her supervisor’s competence
129
amounted to “an act of insubordination.” The Court underscored the importance of maintaining hierarchical office rela130
tionships. The Court then applied the balancing test from
Pickering, weighing the importance of maintaining that hierarchical authority against the minimal relationship that the em131
ployee’s speech had to any matter of public concern. It is thus
apparent that the professional military environment is but a
subset of a broader set of civilian professions wherein hierarchy
132
is an important interest. And military sociologists have noted
128. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (noting that government’s disciplinary action was motivated in part by employee questioning
competence of supervisor), with United States v. Gustafson, 5 C.M.R. 360, 361
(1952) (noting that government’s disciplinary action was provoked by subordinate stating “Captain, you’re no damned good”).
129. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151.
130. Id. at 153.
131. Id. at 154.
132. Martin L. Cook, Army Professionalism: Service to What Ends?, in THE
FUTURE OF THE ARMY PROFESSION 337, 348–49 (Lloyd J. Matthews ed., 2002)
(“The relation between senior attending physicians in teaching hospitals and
their interns is every bit as hierarchical as the military; senior partners of major law firms are without doubt as superior to their junior associates as senior
military officers are to their subordinates.”).
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that the military has not escaped broader societal trends that
require leaders to take into account growing individualism and
133
differences of opinions. Thus, the kinds of concerns and factors that structure authority in the military and civilian workplaces are similar and, presumably, amenable to a balancing
approach like that in Pickering.
III. CONGRESS OR THE COURTS SHOULD ADAPT THE
PICKERING BALANCING TEST TO GOVERN MILITARY AS
WELL AS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES’ SPEECH
The growing erosion of the foundations for judicial deference towards military limitations on members’ free speech
rights opens a window for reform, but does not in itself indicate
which reforms should be enacted. This Part notes two existing
proposals intended to increase military members’ free speech
rights. The “discretionary” approach suggests that existing legal frameworks be retained, but that military commanders be
encouraged to apply Pickering analysis on their own. At the
other extreme, the “pure Pickering” approach suggests that
rules applied to civilian employees derived from the Pickering
line of cases be applied to military employees without any modification. This Part will critique each of these solutions, arguing
instead for a “modified Pickering” approach that does away
with the courts’ traditional presumption of a military that is
separate from and outside the law, while still accommodating
specific functional military requirements. This Part also argues
that the ideal method for implementing this reform is through
modification of the Manual for Courts-Martial. However, reform could be applied through the courts as well.
A. DISCRETIONARY IMPLEMENTATION OF PICKERING STANDARDS
WOULD PROVIDE INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS
One option for reform suggests that Pickering standards be
applied to the military context informally, using the discretion
of military commanders rather than the authority of the
134
courts. Specifically, those promoting discretionary Pickering
standards argue that formal application of Pickering would
burden military operations by threatening readiness and unit

133. See, e.g., Anna Simons, Backbone vs. Box: The Choice Between Principled and Prescriptive Leadership, in THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY PROFESSION,
supra note 132, at 379, 385–87.
134. Carr, supra note 7, at 367.
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cohesion during deployments, even during peacetime. These
conjectures do not, however, include any specific scenarios as to
how Pickering standards would cause these ill effects. Indeed,
they merely highlight the social dynamics within military units
that serve to dissuade most dissenters even in the absence of
136
criminal sanctions contained in the general articles. Since
military customs, military culture, and the overall political demographics of military members would remain the same after
application of Pickering standards to free speech, it is difficult
to see where major new threats to readiness and cohesion
would come from even if a few dissenters were allowed to speak
out without punishment.
Those preferring discretionary application of Pickering
standards also argue that judicial application would involve an
“intrusive and disruptive inquiry into the personnel decisions of
137
the military.” Specifically, they contend that applying Pickering would place civilian courts in a position of reviewing not only criminal convictions under the general articles, but also re138
viewing “administrative discharges and re-assignments.”
Because of the chilling effect of the military’s process for
nonjudicial punishments, this concern is not completely with139
out merit. But there seems no reason to embrace the tacit belief that military courts would not be able to interpret and apply the Pickering standards in the same way that they apply
140
the existing standards from Parker. Moreover, there seems no
basis for the assumption that administrative actions, like
transfers, would be included in civilian judicial oversight any
more than such actions have been included in the civilian con141
text. And civilian courts in the process of scrutinizing military policies have already restricted their review of military
personnel decisions to situations where the case has advanced
142
to the point of discharge. It is reasonable to assume that the
135. Id. at 365.
136. Id. at 361.
137. Id. at 365.
138. Id.
139. See supra Part II.B.2.
140. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (applying a “balancing test” to an Article 134 case).
141. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (acknowledging “the
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter”).
142. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that completed discharge or “long-term suspension” linked to a dis-
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same scope of limitations would apply to civilian judicial reviews based on Pickering standards.
Moreover, predicating Pickering protections on the discretion of military commanders would seem to present an inherent
conflict of interest. After all, the Court has noted that mere dislike for the speech on the part of the workplace supervisor
143
should not be sufficient grounds for punishment. Rendering
the protections of Pickering merely a component of commanders’ discretion would strip away any meaningful check on such
144
arbitrariness. Most importantly, it is the courts—not workplace supervisors or military commanders—that are tasked
145
with determining the proper scope of constitutional rights.
B. PURE PICKERING BALANCING WOULD NEGLECT LEGITIMATE
MILITARY NEEDS
At the opposite extreme from the discretionary approach
lies the option of applying Pickering balancing to regulate military members’ speech without modification in order to further
accelerate the decline of judicial deference towards the mili146
tary. Indeed, some argue that the courts’ traditional deference to the military is not merely conceptually wrong, but ac147
Deference, according to this view, has
tively dangerous.
allowed the military to “manipulate” the Supreme Court into
148
protecting the military from mere embarrassment and con149
ceal mistreatment of detainees since 9/11. Thus, some view
the application of Pickering balancing as a key opportunity to
scale back deference, and thus is justified even apart from the
150
First Amendment implications.

charge recommendation was required to give a military member standing to
challenge the military’s action on constitutional grounds).
143. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (“Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to
silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because
superiors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”).
144. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 889 n.253.
145. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Rosen, supra note 8, at 898–908.
147. Id. at 906–08.
148. Id. at 906 (citing as an example United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953)).
149. Id. at 907.
150. See id. at 899 (“[D]eference to the military has backfired in the past.
The military must be held accountable to ensure that it does not abuse its
power.”).
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Such a ham-handed rejection of all deference, however,
sweeps too broadly. The military does, in fact, have unique requirements that require accommodation by the courts, including in the area of free speech. For example, while it may be correct that “[p]olitical dissent by off-duty, non-uniformed
[military members] does not have the potential to derail the
151
military from its objectives,” this view fails to notice the different civilian and military meanings of “off-duty.” For example, when military members are stationed on bases in the United States where they return to civilian homes at the end of
each duty day, the conflation of civilian and military jobs may
152
be appropriate. But when military members are deployed
overseas, and in particular in combat operations, they are, in
effect, in the “workplace” twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. This requires courts to treat differently military members’ speech by inquiring into the specific location, time, and
conditions surrounding it, acting to protect military members’
speech more aggressively in the United States, but declining to
act when the context of the speech is one that requires deference to uniquely military concerns due to overseas operational
153
deployments. But selective deference is still a form of deference that a purist rejection of judicial deference towards the
154
military would seem to disallow.
Because it is a combat organization, at times requiring intense discipline and camaraderie, the military also has some
unique requirements regarding the substance of speech. While
it is quite correct to note that expressions of dissent do not ne155
cessitate failures of discipline, there are at least two areas
where particular types of speech, that a pure application of the
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
153. See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(upholding restrictions against circulation of anti-war petitions on a military
base in Vietnam as a time, place, or manner restriction on otherwise protected
speech); A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992) (“It’s because it was what
they were ordered to do. Now, out in the real world, that means nothing. And
here at the Washington Navy Yard, it doesn’t mean a whole lot more. But if
you’re a marine assigned to Rifle Security Company Windward, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and you’re given an order, you follow it or you pack your bags.”).
154. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8, at 905–06 (“National security interests
do not justify an abuse of the public trust, which has previously occurred when
the Supreme Court has taken too deferential a stance on military regulations.
The Supreme Court should hold the military to a higher standard, and one
way to achieve this is to apply the public employee doctrine.”).
155. Id. at 905 (“[C]riticism does not automatically lead to insubordination.”).
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Pickering balancing would allow, might damage military discipline. First, the broad application of Pickering balancing would
prohibit the government from punishing employees solely be156
cause of their “political affiliation.” In fact, some assert that
“[t]he military has never indicated that political affiliation is a
157
prerequisite for serving in the armed forces.” But the military
penalizes members for participation in designated hate
158
groups. Such a ban on membership hate groups may be
uniquely justified by the camaraderie necessary for effective
combat units. Moreover, the case of Major Nidal Hasan shows
the need for the military to be sensitive to the adoption by military members of political attitudes that sympathize with a cur159
rent enemy. A pure application of the Pickering public employee doctrine is blind to these considerations which are
legitimately unique to the functional requirements of the military, even without embracing the “separate community”
rationale.
Second, a pure application of Pickering balancing to the
military is blind to the special military status of the President
as Commander-in-Chief. In fact, some would apply Pickering
not only to eliminate military restrictions under the general articles of the UCMJ, but also to eliminate military restrictions
160
barring “contemptuous words” towards the President. Indeed,
some argue that not punishing even endorsements of assassi156. Id. at 893 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976)).
157. Id. at 905. Note that Rosen does not provide any support for this
assertion.
158. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-903, ¶ 5.2 (1998),
available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI51-903.pdf
(“Commanders are authorized to use the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action against military
personnel who actively participate in [hate] groups.”); see also Kevin Baron,
DoD Tightens Hate Group Restrictions, MILITARY.COM (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.military.com/news/article/dod-tightens-hate-group-restrictions.html
(reporting on a recent updated Department of Defense directive increasing restrictions on hate group participation for all the armed services).
159. See Jim Miklaszewski, 9 Officers Face Disciplinary Action in Fort
Hood Shooting, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
42017230/ns/us_news-security/ (reporting punishment of officers supervising the
Fort Hood shooter for failure to react to signs of his increasing radicalization).
160. Compare UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006) ( prohibiting “contemptuous words” toward the President from officers), with Rosen, supra note 8, at
900–01 (criticizing the contrast between Rankin v. McPherson, where the
Court held that a civilian expression of support for presidential assassination
was protected speech, and United States v. Ogren, where a military court
found that a Naval officer’s expression of support for presidential assassination was not protected).
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nation by military members would lead to “more just results”
161
than the current Article 88 prohibitions. But while it may be
true that Article 88 restrictions originate in “seventeenth cen162
tury British anti-treason laws,” the critique exaggerates the
163
scope of the prohibitions and ignores their underlying modern
rationale. In fact, the modern rationale for Article 88 lies in an
apparently legitimate military need to maintain discipline
within a chain of command that places the President at the
164
top. Article 88 also covers only the President, Vice President,
Congress, Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, military
165
departments, and the governors of the states. Article 88 thus
in itself leaves open all other officials and all substantive policies for dissent. Moreover, the military has enforced Article 88
sparingly, mostly focusing narrowly on cases that do not in166
volve substantive dissent based in policy.
C. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION DURING PEACETIME AND
DEFERENCE DURING WARTIME WOULD BOTH PROTECT TOO
MUCH AND TOO LITTLE
Not all scholars have taken such an all-or-nothing approach to reform. For example, some suggest that the free
speech protections of Pickering could be applied to military
members during peacetime, but the courts could defer to the

161. Rosen, supra note 8, at 900.
162. Id. at 880.
163. See id. at 880–81 (claiming without support that Article 88 prohibits
not only “contemptuous words” towards senior officials, but also “leaves soldiers
unable to voice their criticism of a war in which they are forced to participate”).
164. Michael J. Davidson, Contemptuous Speech Against the President,
1999 ARMY LAW. 1, 12 (“The President is more than just another politician. He
is the Commander-in-Chief, and as such, is entitled to no less protection under
the UCMJ than the most junior officer or noncommissioned officer who suffers
disrespect at the hands of an insubordinate private.”).
165. See UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888.
166. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, How to Punish McChrystal?, WASH. POST (June
23, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/06/how_
to_punish_mcchrystal.html (speculating on the potential use of Article 88 to
punish Gen. Stanley McChrystal for pejorative comments directed towards
Vice President Biden and reported in Rolling Stone magazine). It is fairly certain that General McChrystal, the Afghanistan commander at the time, was
not expressing dissent towards the substantive policy of pursuing military action in Afghanistan, but rather merely making personal attacks on administration officials. See Julian E. Barnes & Peter Nicholas, General’s Fate in the
Balance, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 2010, at 13. For an overview of the extent and limits of the military’s policy on “contemptuous words,” see generally Davidson, supra note 164.
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167

military during wartime. Such a compromise could produce
the worst of both worlds, protecting both too much and too little. Too much protection could derive from the fact that most
modern military operations—including combat deployments—
take place in the absence of a declaration of war or even a for168
mal authorization for use of force. That means that even during times and at places in which the military’s need for discipline and camaraderie are at their peak, the “wartime only”
proposal would be as blind to them as a pure approach.
In other contexts, the wartime-only proposal could be too
weak. In the event that there is a declaration of war or authorization for use of force that created “wartime,” those military
members who are far removed from the combat zone and working in jobs similar to civilians would be unnecessarily stripped
of their free speech protections at a time when dissent may be
vitally important to ongoing political debates about military action. Moreover, the military’s use of wartime exigencies as a
blanket justification to demand deference has a dark history in
169
the Korematsu case, and it would serve us well to be cautious
about reenacting a standard that might allow the military to
use the existence of a national emergency to broadly suppress
dissent.
D. PICKERING STANDARDS CAN BE ADAPTED TO UNIQUELY
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
As the foregoing Sections have shown, the optimal balance
for reform of military members’ free speech rights cannot be
found either in purist all-or-nothing approaches or in the blackand-white delineation of wartime from peacetime. Rights of
dissent in the military demand a more nuanced approach that
is sensitive to the unique mixture of combat from noncombat
contexts that exist every day in the modern American military.
Although the military as a whole increasingly resembles a
civilian profession, military life during overseas deployment
167. Sugin, supra note 8, at 857.
168. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/24/obama_
s_unconstitutional_war ( lamenting the ease with which President Obama ordered military action in Libya without any authorization by Congress).
169. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See generally Dawinder S.
Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the
Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L.
REV. 419, 494 –500 (2010) (tracing the recurring theme of abuses when the
Supreme Court allows “wartime” to trump civil liberties concerns).
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more closely resembles the “separate community” traditionally
170
viewed by the courts. The Pickering Court’s distinction between workplace and non-workplace speech does not contemplate the 24/7 workplace that is a defining feature of deployed
171
combat operations. Traditional concerns about the effect of
dissent on morale and discipline are most intense in a combat
environment and, when limited to that environment, constitute
less of an infringement on First Amendment liberties than a
172
general prohibition. Thus, for military members deployed in
combat or peacekeeping, the definition of “workplace” should be
expanded to encompass the entire duration of their deployment. As the Court noted in Garcetti v. Ceballos, speech that
takes place pursuant to actual performance of an employees’
duties can be regulated much more heavily than speech outside
173
the workplace. While a military member stationed “in garrison” in the United States returns home from work each day
and essentially transforms into a civilian while off-duty, a military member deployed overseas is always at some level a representative of the United States government to the people in the
country where he or she is stationed. Thus, Garcetti offers additional justification for this particular adjustment of the Picker174
ing approach to a military context.
Military regulations prohibiting active membership in hate
groups could also be retained under a modified Pickering approach. Acknowledging the unique military need for discipline
and camaraderie, the military’s prohibition on hate groups
should be cast as a uniquely military version of the Connick

170. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 878–80 ( proposing that judicial protections
for military members’ free speech be foregone in wartime under the political
question doctrine). Sugin relies, however, on the assumption that wartime will
involve a draft that serves to enhance the political representation of military
members’ interests. See id. at 880.
171. Cf. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(upholding restrictions against circulation of anti-war petitions on a military
base in Vietnam as a time, place, or manner restriction on otherwise protected
speech).
172. Id. at 1333; see also A FEW GOOD MEN, supra note 153 (“It’s because it
was what they were ordered to do. Now, out in the real world, that means
nothing. And here at the Washington Navy Yard, it doesn’t mean a whole lot
more. But if you’re a marine assigned to Rifle Security Company Windward,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and you’re given an order, you follow it or you pack
your bags.”).
173. 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
174. See id.
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concern about preventing speech that interferes with the mis175
sion of the workplace.
The Pickering approach should also be adapted to retain
the Article 88 prohibitions on personal attacks directed against
the President and other senior government officials. This
should be done by interpreting the “public concern” test narrowly, allowing military members to speak freely in dissent
with regards to the substance of policy while limiting the appropriate manner of that expression to preclude ad hominem
attacks. Thus, it may be best to retain Article 88 prohibitions
as exceptions to the Pickering balancing process while limiting
the reach of those protections to those areas most essential to
military discipline.
While still incorporating limits narrowly tailored to specific
military concerns, this adaptation of the Pickering balancing
approach towards workers’ dissenting speech would still represent a dramatic expansion of the free speech rights of military
members. As former Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in his influential description of the application of the Bill of Rights to
military members, “situations in which the judiciary refrains
from examining the merit of the claim of [military] necessity
176
must be kept to an absolute minimum.” But the adaptations
proposed here would apply the Pickering standards to a military context, protecting dissent on matters of public concern
while at the same time weighing the government’s interest in
177
Moreover, such a weighing
effective military operations.
would not prevent the government from addressing serious
threats to military discipline, but would require the government to show actual, rather than merely speculative, threats to
178
discipline before proscribing dissent. But importantly, these
adaptations would serve to balance military and members’ interests without regard to formalistic wartime/peacetime
distinctions.
E. THE ADAPTED PICKERING STANDARDS COULD BE ENACTED
THROUGH THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL OR INDEPENDENT
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The most direct route for implementing reform would be
through the President. Because the goal of maintaining “good
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 (1983).
Warren, supra note 51, at 193.
See Sugin, supra note 8, at 884.
Id. at 888–89; see also id. at 888 n.247.
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order and discipline” would be maintained as a legitimate gov179
ernment interest under the adapted Pickering rules, it would
not be necessary to amend the UCMJ itself. Rather, the President could insert the adapted Pickering rules into the relevant
sections of the MCM, requiring the prosecution to show that
“disloyal statements” took place within a workplace as defined
above and either did not regard a matter of public concern or
had an actual deleterious effect on the functioning of the unit’s
180
mission.
Even if the President fails to act, however, the courts could
apply Pickering standards to the military independently. After
all, as the Supreme Court has noted, military members do not
181
forfeit their constitutional rights upon joining the military.
The “different application” of those rights was a creation of the
182
Court in Parker. The Court is therefore surely competent to
disabuse itself of its own doctrinal creation.
CONCLUSION
Although courts have traditionally drawn a sharp separation between the speech rights of government civilian employees and those of the military, this distinction has rested on erroneous assumptions regarding the separation between
military and civilian communities and the role of dissent within
military organizations. Recently, however, civilian courts have
begun to question the deference traditionally accorded to the
military, particularly with regard to service members’ civil liberties. This presents an opportunity for the President or the
courts to promulgate a more contemporary standard for regulating speech in the military workplace. This new standard
need not be invented from whole cloth, however, as the balancing test developed in Pickering and Connick offers a sufficient
basis for adapting a new doctrine for dealing with military dissent—a dissent without disloyalty.

179. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
180. See UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006) (empowering the President to issue regulations implementing the UCMJ “including modes of proof [ ]
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial”); see also Levy v.
Dillon 286 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Kan. 1968), aff ’d, 415 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.
1969) (holding that the MCM has the force of statutory law).
181. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“[M]embers of the
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment . . . .”).
182. See id.

